Brady Aiken Got Screwed, Then He Screwed Himself
Baseball’s No. 1 overall pick didn’t make the rules, but his decision to pick up his ball and go home may have a lasting impact on his and others’ careers.
Pitcher Brady Aiken, the No. 1 overall pick in the 2014 Major League Baseball draft back in early June, took a huge risk by not signing with the Houston Astros by the July 18 deadline. It was a decision — and likely a mistake — not borne of rational analysis.
To recap, Aiken, a big, hard-throwing left-hander, came to terms with the Houston Astros on a $6.5 million signing bonus (contingent on a physical) that would have matched the record for a high school pitcher. The Astros later discovered that Aiken’s ulner colateral ligament in his pitching arm was abnormal — smaller than normal, to be specific. ESPN’s Keith Law called it an “irregularity.” Aiken does not need Tommy John surgery; the ligament is not torn, fully or partially. Doctors have cleared Aiken to go pitch. Per Bleacher Report’s Will Carroll, Aiken is 100 percent asymptomatic. He feels no pain.
The Astros, on the other hand, felt differently. Having come to the conclusion that Aiken’s “situation” creates a high degree of risk for the team, Houston unilaterally rescinded its offer in favor of a reduced sum equal to just 40 percent of the recommended amount for the top overall selection slot ($3.1 million). Just prior to the signing deadline, the Astros reportedly upped their offer significantly — to as high as $5 million — but, incredibly, Aiken’s representatives never responded, and the star pitcher will be left on the outside looking in until next year’s draft. At least.
Criticizing Houston for its role in this is easy. (Nick Faleris appropriately skewered the Astros over at Baseball Prospectus.) In the end, though, Aiken — or whoever was advising him— acted foolishly, stubbornly and impulsively in ignoring what ended up being a fair offer. In deciding either that: 1) signing with the Astros was a non-starter after the way he was treated; or 2) that $5 million was insufficient compensation despite the inherent risk associated with young pitchers, Aiken’s camp squandered what may very well be a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity.
There is no use in sugarcoating it: Major League Baseball’s current draft system is ridiculously unfair. On the open market, Aiken likely would be worth a multiple of the entire Astros’ draft budget. At Beyond the Box Score, Daniel Schoenfield argues that Aiken would be worth six years, $20 million. Other industry estimates were even higher.
The most recent MLB Collective Bargaining Agreement sought to tamp down the escalation of amateur signing bonuses, and it has largely succeeded, as teams spent less on bonuses in 2012 and 2013 than they did in 2011, the final year of the previous agreement. This is no surprise considering the game’s union, the Major League Baseball Players’ Association, does not represent amateurs, and, as a group, prospective pros had no seat at the bargaining table during the negotiations with the league.
For Aiken, his choice should have come down an equation:
SB14+ E(C14) > SB15 + E(C15) + E (FA)
This formula represents the signing bonus Aiken would have received in 2014 (“SB14") plus his career earnings in total from 2014 on (“C14") against the the expected value of the signing bonus in 2015 (or later if he decides to attend UCLA) (“SB15") plus his career earnings in total from 2015 on (“C15"). Not the additional component (“FA”), which represents Aiken’s expected value for the small chance he is declared a free agent via grievance. If the left side was greater, he should sign now. If the right side is larger, he should wait.
We know Houston (eventually) offered Aiken $5 million. Had Team Aiken engaged in negotiations before the deadline passed, maybe would have been able to extract a bit more. Let’s settle on $5.5 million in an amicable deal. After all, not paying Aiken was never really an option for Houston, primarily because their failure to seal the deal with the pitcher precluded them from using the funds allocated to him to sign other prospects, as well. For reference, pitchers Tyler Kolek and Carlos Rodon— the No. 2 and No. 3 overall selections, prospectively — both signed for over $5 million.
So, to recap, our equation now looks like this:
$5.5 million + E (C14) > E (SB15) + E (C15) + E (FA)
There is no information to suggest that Major League Baseball will break precedent and make Aiken a free agent. Doing so would reward other players for holding teams hostage to meet their contract demands, and the league is highly unlikely, to say the least, to do anything that might condone such a practice.
Even with word that the MLBPA has filed a grievance against the Astros, it’s not unreasonable to put Aiken’s chances of being declared a free agent at 1 percent — and that’s probably being generous. Let’s assume that his current free agent value, as posited by Schoenfield, is $20 million. That means Aiken’s expected free agency value is, at best, $200,000 (one percent of $20 million). That also leaves a 99 percent chance he ends up with a signing bonus as a draftee, rather than a free agency deal.
Our equation now looks like:
$5.5 million + E (C14) > (0.99)E (SB15) + E (C15) + $200,000
Leaving the career earnings aside for a moment, it’s fair to ask what kind of signing bonus Aiken might collect if he re-enters the draft in 2015 (if he attends junior college) or 2017 (if he attends UCLA, assuming he is granted eligibility by the NCAA).
In 2014, Aiken’s draft slot (1st round, 1st pick) carried a $7.9 million price tag. Historically, though, teams rarely use their entire slot allotment to sign their first round pick — often allocating funds to sign their pick and to chase other high-end available talents. This year, seven of the other nine players drafted in the top 10 overall signed for the recommended slot value or less. The previous No. 1 overall picks under the current CBA — Carlos Correa in 2012, and Mark Appel in 2013 — each signed deals that were under slot, too, both with the Astros. Appel signed for $6.35 million in 2013, after failing to come to terms in 2012 ($1.6 million below the then-present slot). Correa signed for $4.8 million in 2012 (some $2.4 million below the $7.2 million value for the first overall pick).
Slot values for the top picks have risen very slowly under the current CBA. The top pick for example, increased by less than 2 percent from 2013 to 2014. Given a similar rate of increase, the only way that Aiken could be drafted in a spot with a higher value in 2015 would be to go first overall again (which can’t happen if Houston finishes with the worst record and has the first overall pick, to go along with the second overall pick they will have because Aiken didn’t sign). If he were to attend UCLA, he would still need to go first overall in 2017 for his slot value to exceed 2014' s $7.9 million tag. Working forward three years — assuming the increase in value remains consistent — only the top two picks will even carry values that exceed the (possible) $5.5 million he turned down two weeks ago.
History is working against Aiken, too.
Over the 20-year-span from 1991-2010, only five of the high school pitchers drafted in the top half of the first round (first 15 picks) did not sign. Of those, none improved their draft position in the next or later drafts. At Baseball America, Clint Longenecker found that among the 12 high school pitchers since 1987 who did not sign, only four retained their first-round draft status the next time around.
And therein lies the risk; Aiken’s value — his perceived value, anyway — will likely never be as high as it is right now.
Any non-trivial injury or any significant drop in his performance will lead to a decline in Aiken’s draft stock. In other words, there is nowhere to go but down. Even if Aiken gets drafted, stays healthy, and makes it to the Show, he would have been better off starting his professional career in 2014 — assuming things like the longest career possible and a maximization of his career earnings interest him.
Unless the MLB Draft is restructured, there are few scenarios whereby Aiken’s expected signing bonus value (E(SB15)) is greater than the $5.5 million we suggested was reasonable for him to have negotiated this time around from the Astros. But the decision to forgo those dollars looks even worse when you consider that most high school pitchers never even get to capitalize on their abilities in the Majors.
First, let’s compare every pitcher drafted straight out of high school in the first 15 overall picks from 1991 (Brien Taylor) through the present:
A “Bust” represents those draftees who never pitched in the Bigs. A whopping 55+ percent of these pitchers never signed another Major League contract after their signing bonus. We know that the expected career values decline sharply, especially at the top of the first round. Taking into account only the first high school pitcher drafted, and restricting the sample to those taken in the Top 15 overall picks, still yields a bust rate of over 50 percent.
Applying this data to Aiken to, there’s a better-than-even chance that he won’t ever pitch in the big leagues, nor will he ever sign another professional contract.
But what about career earnings?
The above sample size has been limited to players who were drafted in 2006 and earlier; allowing for plenty of time for the subjects to reach the Majors and establish some degree of career longevity. (The right-most column is average MLB earnings in millions.) The group of features one of the best pitchers in the game today — if not the very best — in Clayton Kershaw, who was drafted seventh overall back in in 2006. Also included are Homer Bailey, Zack Greinke, and Josh Beckett, some average-ish pitchers like John Danks and Gavin Floyd, and total busts like Clint Everts and Mike Stodolka.
Note that the “first high school pitcher taken” outperforms the overall group by significant margins in Bust Rate, but also in average MLB value, which correlates directly to career earnings. Still, only five of these 14 (35 percent) players signed second MLB contracts. For every Kershaw, there’s a Mark Rogers, who made nine starts in the Bigs, or Colt Griffin, who made none. Very few pitchers live up to hype. Some break, some don’t. Some become stars, some achieve ordinary status. The majority, though, never pan out.
Sure, Major League salaries have been trending way, way upward in recent years, so it’s impossible to know with any degree of certainty what Aiken might earn — if he stays healthy and produces. If the data shows that just 35 percent of high school pitchers sign another professional contract, though, it stands to reason that the odds of cashing in are probably not in his favor.
But what about guys drafted first overall?
From 1991 through 2010, players drafted first overall include some of the game’s brightest stars. The list includes Alex Rodriguez, Joe Mauer, Adrian Gonzalez, Darin Erstad, Stephen Strasburg and David Price. Notice the relative absence of pitchers, though?
Of those 20 total first-overall picks, eight were pitchers.
Truthfully, only Strasburg and David Price can be considered successful in the Majors. Yes, Hochevar is a competent reliever (now out for for the entire 2014 season with Tommy John surgery) and Kris Benson was decent for a minute or two, but Bullington, Anderson, Wilson and Taylor were all certified busts. And, seven out of eight of those pitchers experienced major arm trouble — either the dreaded TJ or a serious structural shoulder issue. Three of the eight never reached a second MLB contract.
In the end, teams will always take chances on hard-throwing pitchers at the top of the draft — mostly because such talents are the biggest weapons in the game, and remain nearly impossible to find and develop. Never mind that there is a strong link between higher velocities and an increased risk of Tommy John surgery. When it comes to Aiken, as talented as he appears, there is a reason why he is thought of as a commodity.
So, while Aiken can light up a radar gun now, the fact that he’s working with a smaller-than-normal ligament in his elbow should have been enough to give him pause, especially considering those who came before him — those who are footnotes in the game’s injury-littered past.
Even setting aside career earning potential that would have started a year (or three) earlier, signing for $5 million (or more) was nothing to sneeze at. There is at least a decent chance that Aiken never sees that money again.
