The Evolution Of The Power Forward In The NBA
In an era where point guards and three-point shooting rule, the ‘4’ might be the most important strategic piece on the court.
To hear head coach Steve Kerr tell it, the ascension of the Golden State Warriors to their current historical pace may well have been a happy accident.
Stephen Curry might be the best basketball player in the world, and he and Klay Thompson undoubtedly form the best shooting backcourt in NBA history, but all of that — along with their elite defense — was true prior to the dismissal of former head coach Mark Jackson.
The key to unlocking the full depths of the Warriors’ potential can then be traced to two pivotal moments last season — David Lee’s injury at the end of preseason that pushed Draymond Green into the starting lineup, and the benching of Andrew Bogut in the NBA Finals for wing Andre Iguodala, solidifying Golden State’s now-vaunted ‘death lineup’ (with Green at center) as a force the coaching staff could trust.
In an article written by ESPN’s Zach Lowe (then with Grantland) during the NBA Finals, Kerr admitted he had Green penciled in for just 10–12 minutes a night heading into last season. A horrible preseason from a pressing Green did little to dissuade that line of thinking.
“I had no idea Draymond was going to be this good,” Kerr admits. “But you look at the way the game is played now, and it’s all about versatility and two-way players. Can you score a basket and then guard three positions?”
If Lee doesn’t get hurt, perhaps the Warriors maintain a reasonable enough level of success that his presence blocks Green from getting meaningful minutes. Kerr is honest enough to admit it was a lucky change, at least at first. But grander evolution can occur from random variations that, unpredictably, give something an advantage in its current environment, and few positions have evolved over the past decade as much as power forward.
If basketball were like a game of chess, the power forward position would be the most important piece on the board. In a league with a dearth of post-scoring centers and an emphasis on spot-up shooting wings, Green’s emergence unlocked a myriad of lineup combinations for Kerr and allowed the Warriors to maintain their preferred style of play regardless of their opponent. If a team is going to challenge Golden State this season, it won’t be by meeting Curry head-on as much as by swinging the all-too-important power forward matchup back (somewhat) in their favor.
“While Golden State won a championship doing that (small ball) this year, this, all in my mind, began a couple of years ago with what the Miami Heat did. They basically saw two elite offensive players in Wade and James and said, ‘Let’s give these guys offensive space. Let’s open up, let’s take the bigs out, let’s make Bosh a three-pointer shooter — whether he’s at the four or the five’ — and at times play with five three-point shooters out there, and then force teams to try to contain the elite offensive weapons with everybody out at the three-point line. It’s very difficult to guard.”
— Indiana head coach Frank Vogel, on the Dan Dakich Show
The game of basketball is about the manipulation of space and management of resources. Rule changes designed to discourage long-developing post and isolation plays, along with the proliferation of talented point guards, made the spread pick-and-roll the primary vehicle through which most modern NBA offenses operate.
When Mike D’Antoni and the Phoenix Suns shifted Shawn Marion up to the power forward position, where his 3-point shooting was a plus relative to his position and his speed created havoc, it unlocked countless options off the high screen-and-roll; Phoenix forced opponents to commit an extra man to defend the action while spreading defenses too far apart to recover.
At the same time, Dirk Nowitzki helped revolutionize the power forward position by popularizing the ‘stretch four,’ showing how elite shooting from one of the two power positions could distort a defense beyond repair.
To counter, teams began to better utilize zone principles with longer, rangier wings capable of swarming traditional post attempts while switching and disrupting pick and rolls without committing any extra defenders to it. The San Antonio Spurs, as always, were ahead of the curve — finding bargains in wings who could defend multiple actions and positions, but whose offensive skill sets were limited to standing in the corners and hitting 3-pointers.
Today, analytics have helped largely correct the market deficiency by identifying the best and worst shots and the types of players great at converting and preventing them. The aims of a healthy offense are to force defenses to collapse and expand like an accordion, eventually leading to a breakdown at the rim or along the three-point line. Three-and-D wings — from Danny Green to DeMarre Carroll and Jae Crowder (the latter two of which both moonlight as power forwards) — received sizable pay increases over the summer. Similarly, dive-and-deny centers — bigs who can protect the rim and dive hard off screens for dunks — have seen their value increase.
As the emphasis increased on the 3-pointer, plus the limits of the salary cap and a natural tendency to mimic what’s been successful, the NBA has become a little more homogenized — surrounding a primary ball-handler and big pick-and-roll combination with shooting along the wings. In that environment, the power forward has increasingly become an important secondary source of playmaking.
It’s not enough for power forwards to just space the floor anymore. To have one capable of creating for himself and others means a team can afford to reach into the deeper — and therefore cheaper — talent pool of wings or point guards with good defense and shooting, but limited shot-creation abilities.
Between the Warriors’ switch-heavy schemes and adoption of Tom Thibodeau-schemed defenses designed to load up on the strong side, quality NBA defenses are astute at walling off the first point of attack.
Whether involved directly in the pick-and-roll, or flashing into the vacated area between the first and back lines of defense, the first pressure release pass is often the best opportunity to attack a defense four-on-three, which is why teams like the Pacers are trying to shift their best players up to that power forward position offensively — giving them the ball in open space.
The evolution of the power forward position isn’t all about spacing the floor with better shooters, though.
The Los Angeles Clippers still use a traditional frontcourt alignment and all the spacing issues that come with it (even though they haven’t really been more effective this season with all three of their primary players on the floor versus combinations among Chris Paul, Blake Griffin and DeAndre Jordan). Though Griffin has expanded his range, he’s still not a natural 3-point shooter — nor should he be, considering his vast talents are better served elsewhere.
Instead of shooting, the Clippers thrive on offense, in part, because Griffin can operate comfortably catching the ball in the pockets of space modern defenses are designed to give up. Despite his considerable physical attributes, Griffin’s greatest strength is the ability to navigate those uncomfortable spots on the court and quickly read and dissect defensive rotations with his deft passing.
Switch, and Griffin can easily overpower smaller defenders. Fail to rotate, and Griffin is comfortable shooting from the elbows or launching himself toward the rim after gathering a full head of steam, before the defense can recover. Rotate from the wings, and Griffin easily finds J.J. Redick for a three. Take one step off Jordan, and the Clippers’ spacing problem is solved on that possession by going vertical with a lob.
The ability to read a broken, chaotic field has become key for the power forward position against opponents capable of covering more ground than ever.
For teams like the Utah Jazz, who rely on a dominant defense anchored by two elite defensive bigs, the viability of their starting lineup isn’t necessarily contingent on one of them (Rudy Gobert or Derrick Favors) developing three-point shooting range. A far more likely path to success is one developing enough gravitas in the paint to draw attention, and how well they coordinate their movements and timing.
The San Antonio Spurs and Memphis Grizzlies are two recent examples of successful big-men tandems who thrived by supplementing precisely choreographed movements with expert interior passing. The old Spurs combination of Tim Duncan and Tiago Splitter, in particular, is a great model for a workable big-man pairing with limited shooting range — sealing off defenders on the weak side while the other flashes into open spaces for quick high-low passes; or shorting dives off the pick-and-roll for quick dump offs.
The key is making quick decisions to keep the ball moving. Of course, the more expansive the skill set, the more ways to bend and break a defense.
Boris Diaw isn’t a great player by any means. In fact, under less than ideal circumstances — as was the case in Charlotte — it was hard to call him a good one. But, when given a favorable matchup on this Spurs team, he can leverage it in ways normally reserved for superstars.
Since Diaw signed with the Spurs, head coach Gregg Popovich has used him as something of trump card — inserting him into the starting lineup against the likes of the Miami Heat in the 2014 NBA Finals, or using him to occupy Serge Ibaka against the Oklahoma City Thunder in the Western Conference Finals preceding that.
Though the league has trended smaller, quicker, and more skilled, size still matters in the NBA; and Diaw’s arrival has allowed San Antonio to maintain its defensive integrity and offensive spacing while keeping a traditionally sized frontcourt in a compromise that Spurs head coach Gregg Popovich calls “medium ball.”
Via Jabari Young of the San Antonio Express-News:
“He really understands the game, he’s a really good basketball player,” said Popovich. “With his size, he can play outside, he can play in. He handles the ball like a point guard. He passes. He’s really an intelligent player and makes a lot of things happen. He’s real valuable to us.”
In the Spurs’ “beautiful game” spread pick-and-roll offense, Diaw operated as a perfect pressure release valve, turning defenses that blitzed San Antonio’s high pick-and-rolls into easy four-on-three opportunities with his guard-like skills. Today, with the Spurs mixing in more isolation and post opportunities, he’s both the wedge that splits defenses — using his large frame to bully opponents under the rim — and a spot-up outlet to keep defenses honest.
Though his raw statistics aren’t overwhelming, his ability to do everything from the power forward position allows Popovich to liberally mix-and-match different combinations around him, whether it be more spot-up shooting with less playmaking ability in Danny Green or Patty Mills, a post-up threat in Duncan, LaMarcus Aldridge, or Kawhi Leonard, or pick-and-roll savants like Tony Parker or Manu Ginobili — blending styles seamlessly to adapt to their opponents.
Under former Popovich protege Mike Budenholzer, the Atlanta Hawks installed many of the same principles as the Spurs’ motion-heavy offense, exaggerating certain elements by putting more shooting on the floor.
In that system, Paul Millsap has thrived due to his ability to adapt to any circumstance. In many ways, the evolution of the power forward position an be tracked simply by looking back on Millsap’s career. When he entered the NBA in 2006 with the Utah Jazz, he was a bruising power forward who thrived on the glass and showed the inklings of a midrange jumper.
When Utah added Al Jefferson and Favors, it was Millsap who adjusted to them, extending his standstill shooting range out to the 3-point line, working as a passable stretch four. In Atlanta, he’s added a little more juice off the bounce, increasing the diversity of his skill set.
The Hawks’ motion and shooting create switches across the board, and while each player has their own strengths and weaknesses — Teague off his dribble penetration, Bazemore cutting off the ball, Korver’s shooting — it’s Millsap’s ability to adapt to whatever defender rotates to him that keeps the offense from skipping a beat.
Against more lithe, agile forwards and wings, Millsap can turn to a reliable post game. Against traditional power forwards, he’s capable of drawing them out the arc and driving past them. More important, he’s able to make the right reads and decisions as the defense rotates, his role changing with every bounce of the ball.
“He’s a small forward,” Jeff Teague told the Atlanta Journal-Constitution,” in a power forward’s body.”
Over the summer, the Indiana Pacers lost David West and jettisoned Roy Hibbert. In December, the Memphis Grizzlies moved Zach Randolph out of the starting lineup. With that, two of the NBA’s most important proponents of traditional lineups waved the white flag and surrendered to the modern era.
But not every team is willing to cede what has become the equivalent of the positional high ground. Perhaps conceding that no team can take the Warriors on at their own game, Popovich and R.C. Buford went the opposite direction, signing LaMarcus Aldridge and David West, lowering the number of their possessions, and blending elements of their motion offense with a post-and-isolation-style attack.
The Spurs and Warriors appear to be on a collision course, and the gambit is that Aldridge proves too physical and skilled for the Warriors to switch match-ups, or to go small for extended stretches.
Popovich has been around long enough to see how ceding this position to the other team can shift a series. For over a decade, he had the best power forward in the NBA. When Duncan slowed, and the Spurs first shifted to their spread attack and dominated the regular season, it was the dominance of Zach Randolph that forced the Spurs out of their uptempo offense in the 2011 playoffs. In their first Finals against the Miami Heat, it was their inability to handle LeBron James at power forward that did them in. Against the Oklahoma City Thunder, it was the athleticism and shooting of Serge Ibaka and Kevin Durant at power forward that wreaked havoc on their system.
Coincidentally, it was Diaw’s ability to solve for all of those things, locking their opponents into more traditional looks and schemes, that tilted everything in their favor.
Draymond Green isn’t the best player on his team, and would probably be further down most lists of players to build around than his impact would suggest, but every matchup against the Warriors is going to be a clash of styles, and all roads go through their revolutionary power forward and what you can do to counteract him.
